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Girls should not face these problems. Girls or females should not find themselves in a position where they have to go
to the police.  They should not give their personal information and should not post their original photographs on the
Internet. Anyone can snatch the photograph on the Internet and use it for their own purposes. One should do those
things to avoid probable offences.
A Representative from the Mumbai Cyber Police Cell, 22 January 2013
Everyone I know, any normal person I know is very uncertain of any law and is very unconfident about whatever the
legal framework. First step to the police station and you know it is not going to be of any help to you....it is going to
be a headache for you...in terms of everything...in terms of listening to you, in terms of helping you… I am always
hoping that it will never ever go to the realm of actually hitting the legal framework.
Muksaan, an active social media user, 11 December 2012
Most of what we read is how Section 66A is used against the Internet users. I am not sure that if I should go to the
police if I face abusive speech online. 
Kalpana, an online activist and social media user, 22 January 2013
From sexual harassment to rape threats to gender-based hate speech, women face disproportionate levels of
abuse online. In ‘”Don’t Let It Stand!”:  An Exploratory Study of Women and Verbal Online Abuse on the
Internet in India’, research findings indicate that this is a growing issue for women across the world, and that
women develop a variety of strategies to deal with the verbal threats they face. However, these strategies
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very rarely include the law, resulting in a silence around issues of legal effectiveness and recourse for online
verbal abuse. This paper asks, how and to what extent can the law in India help?
As our research shows, for many women living in India, there are several reasons why legal recourse is an
absolute last-resort, or simply not a resort at all. Engagements with the police often result in women being
disbelieved or, worse, blamed – as the quote from the Mumbai Cyber Cell demonstrates – for the harassment
they face, both online and offline. Given that cyber laws are relatively new, a lack of knowledge around these
provisions – on both the part of women and the police – may pose additional barriers. 
In other cases, the law itself may be considered problematic. For example, the most well-known Internet-
related law in India at present is perhaps the highly controversial Section 66A of the Information Technology
(Amendment) Act,  2008  (IT Act),  which allows for,  among other things,  an addressing of verbal  abuse
online. Extensively criticised for making possible widespread censorship, the particular difficulties women
face online have been frequently used as a justification for this law: defending Section 66A, Union Minister
for Communications and Information Technology Kapil Sibal explicitly said in an interview with NDTV,
‘Many kinds  of  threats  can  be  given  on  the  Internet  [to  women]  which  cannot  be  given  on  a  normal
communication network. Therefore, the nature of the law has to be different.’1 In other words, the same law
that was, for example, used to arrest Shaheen Dhada for questioning the shutdown of Mumbai city during the
death of right-wing leader Bal Thackery in her Facebook status, was created, in fact, to protect women. 
But do women feel protected? As one of the opening quotations of the paper illustrates, our research has
shown that even the women who face a great deal of abuse online refrain from resorting to Section 66A,
given the implications  that it has for censorship and freedom of expression. Furthermore, the study also
brought up wider questions of women’s reluctance towards and negative experiences of engaging with the
law and law enforcement, bringing to the fore various questions around the ways in which the legal structure
as a whole addresses women’s issues and women’s rights. 
It is the latter that this discussion paper will engage with directly, by seeking to understand whether existing
legal provisions to address verbal abuse online in India are sufficient – and if not, why not – beginning with
an examination of the ways in which laws construct women. Do they seek to empower women, or are they
largely predicated on a notion of ‘protection’? In the second section, the paper will then analyse in greater
detail the various provisions in the law that can be drawn on specifically to address the verbal abuse of
women online. Finally,  in the third section, the paper will  put  forward a number of possible alternative
solutions that have emerged over the course of our research, serving as a starting point for further debate and
discussion. 
1. Gender and Censorship: where do women fit in?
1.1. Women as Objects or Subjects of Obscenity? 
A consideration of the ways in which Indian law seeks to address women’s issues and rights  immediately
brings to the fore the most visible marker of gender – the female body. There is a disproportionate emphasis
throughout the Indian legal  structure placed on the  representation of  women, women’s  bodies and their
sexuality. The creation, publication or circulation of such imagery is believed by many to contribute to the
exploitation of women. In this manner, the protection of a woman is seen as synonymous with the protection
of her  image. But who are these laws really protecting? Is the culprit female sexuality? If so, who is the
1  'Facebook arrests were case of over-reach: Kapil Sibal to NDTV', NDTV, 29 November 2012. Last accessed 8 March 2013.
victim – public morality? The notion of morality vis-à-vis female bodies and sexualities is deeply entrenched
within not only our social culture but our legal culture as well. While many morality-driven ideas are found
in the IT Act today, they are preceded by offline laws that came into existence far before the cyber era. This
section will consider the development and implementation of these laws, and the ways in which they serve as
a wider insight into the impetus of law-making in relation to women’s issues in India
Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) defines obscenity as that which is ‘lascivious or appeals to the
prurient interest  or  tends to deprave or corrupt  persons’.  In the IT Act, too, specific sections have been
included in order to deal with the issue of defining and restricting the ‘obscene’ on the Internet: Section 67,
publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form and Section 67A, publishing or transmitting of
material  containing  a  sexually explicit  act  in  electronic  form.  The  latter  was  added when the  Act  was
amended in 2008. Section 67 exactly replicates Section 292 of the IPC; however, punishments under the IT
Act are much stronger. Under Section 292, a first conviction can lead to a prison term of up to two years and
a fine of up to two thousand rupees. A second or subsequent conviction carries a prison term of up to five
years, and a five thousand rupee fine. However, under Section 67, a first conviction can lead to a prison term
of  up  to  three  years  and  a  fine  of  up  to  five  lakh  rupees.  In  the  event  of  subsequent  convictions,
imprisonment can extend up to five years, with a fine of up to ten lakh rupees. The seriousness with which
the crime of obscenity is viewed is heightened by the change in medium.
Section  67A,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an entirely new legal  provision with no  offline  precedent;  it  is  the
inclusion of a new crime under which all fines can be of up to 10 lakh rupees.  2 Stated exceptions to all the
above laws are materials that can be proved to be ‘justified as being for the public good’, extending to art,
literature,  science  and  learning.  However,  given  that  none  of  these  fields  are  defined  monolithically,
justifications may be left open to subjective understandings.
Indeed, what is of particular interest to the present study are the underlying issues surrounding obscenity
these sections raise. Obscene material as one having ‘the tendency to deprave or corrupt’ is a phrase couched
in ambiguity, and its potential for varying interpretations may lead to disagreements between judges. For
example, in a case pertaining to the description of the female anatomy in a work of literature by a well-
known writer, a High Court judge believed the content to be obscene, whereas the Supreme Court judges
overruled the decision, believing it to be for the advancement of art. 3 With no scientific or sociologically
accepted definition of what is depraved or corrupting – or, for that matter,  a singular understanding and
approach to the field of ‘art’ - a large breadth of interpretative space is created as per the personal values,
views and perspectives of individuals. 
Furthermore, the definition of obscenity as lascivious (lustful, with a desire for sexual practices) or appealing
to the prurient interest (arising from indulgence in lustful thought) is, as Indira Jaising points out, a concept
of obscenity as one deriving from 19th Century Christianity, ‘according to which anything to do with sex is
dirty and obscene’.4 As the legal system sets up sexual desire as linked to immorality and the repression of
this desire as linked to morality, it is therefore important to understand how these notions of morality arose in
the Indian legal framework. The definition of obscenity as provided in Section 292 of the IPC was taken
from an English case in 1868, where a priest was accused for an anti-Catholic text published under his name.
In determining whether or not the content of the text was obscene, the presiding judge declared, ‘I think the
test of obscenity is this: whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt
2  Ibid. 
3  Jaising, Indira (2006). Obscenity: The Use and Abuse of the Law. In Bose, B. (Ed.), Gender and Censorship. New Delhi: 
Women Unlimited.
4  Ibid., p. 121. 
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may
fall.’5
Who is the judge referring to, as having minds that are ‘open to such immoral influences’? In colonial times,
this was probably used to talk about the subjects of colonisation: the barbaric, the illiterate, and by extension,
the easily corruptible. Today, these standards remain much the same; however, those wielding the censor
stick have changed.  Having to a certain extent inherited the morality, power and literacy of their colonisers,
the Indian middle class perpetuate the parameters of the censor – to protect themselves from others. William
Mazzarella writes, 
Critics of censorship often remark, wryly, that if the job of the censors really is to keep their fellow citizens safe from
the sensory toxins of obscenity and sedition, then perhaps the censors themselves should, after a few years of self-
sacrificing  public  service  on  the  Board,  qualify  for  some  kind  of  Government  disability  pension  consider  the
presumably debilitating dosages they must have absorbed in the course of their work. [This] witticism expresses the
perceived hypocrisy of censorship: a protective service on behalf of the general public by members of the public who
are themselves somehow miraculously immune to contamination. (my italics).6
While exploring the role of British rule in the development of obscenity laws, it is also important to consider
the ways in which culture and morality become intertwined in the context of an ex-colonised nation that
seeks to  define itself  against  the  legacy of  its  past  rulers.  ‘Indian Culture’ has  been mythologised – in
particular by the Hindu right – into a singular, monolithic past of purity, separable from Western influences.
Subsequently,  the female body has become the site on which this battle for culture plays out,  where the
sexless, clothed Bhartiya Naari is the epitome of cultural purity, whereas the reality of her body and lived
experience are seen as an affront to this mythic culture; something to be curbed. Again, the gatekeepers of
this culture – the Censor Board and its allies – are considered to be ‘immune’ from the harmful effects of
such imagery.  A report from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting of the Govt of India made in
1980 reads: ‘We feel that…the overall objective of censorship is to safeguard generally accepted standards of
morality and decency,  in addition to the well recognised interests  of  the state…’7 In her introduction to
Gender and Censorship, editor Brinda Bose writes, 
It is not necessary to read very deep between the lines of the report to recognise that the ambiguities inherent to a
governmental  desire  to  “safeguard  generally  accepted  standards  of  morality  and  decency”  are  in  reality  totally
subservient to its desire to safeguard “the well recognised interests of the State”, however they may be defined. In
both these contexts, however, at points where sexuality and/or sexual representation are an issue, the object of control
is the woman… It is the woman who represents both the threat of transgression in Indian society and the need for its
control, and her body is the single signifier that sums up the problematic (ed. Bose, 2006, p.).8 
1.2. Indecency Laws: the Death of Agency?
The issue of the female body – and its control – as being central to the notion of morality is nowhere clearer
than in the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act 1986 (IRWA), which is currently under
consideration  for  amendment  by  Parliament  to  include  virtual  spaces. The  Act  defines  the  ‘indecent
representation of women’ as a 
publication or distribution in any manner, of any material depicting a woman as a sexual object or which is lascivious
or appeals to the prurient interests; or depiction, publication or distribution in any manner, of the figure of a woman,
5 Quoted in Mazzarella, William (2011). The Obscenity of Censorship: Rethinking a Middle-class Technology. In Baviskar, 
A. And Ray, R. (Eds.), Elite and Everyman: The Cultural Politics of the Indian Middle Classes. New Delhi: Routledge. pp. 338.
6 Ibid., p. 342-343. 
7 Bose, B. (Ed.), Gender and Censorship. New Delhi: Women Unlimited. p. xxiv 
8 Ibid.
her form or body or any part thereof in such a way as to have the effect of being indecent or derogatory to or
denigrating women or which is likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality or morals.
Furthering the ideological impetus behind Section 292, the IRWA is steeped within the assumption that any
image that is sexually provocative or explicit is insulting to Indian womanhood or necessarily corrupting. Its
ambiguity  also  results  in  a  situation  where  the  lines  of  ‘decency’ are  drawn  by  select  and  powerful
individuals.  Again,  the  vague framing of  the  law renders  the  IRWA open to interpretation,  wherein the
provided definition for the ‘indecent representation of women’ could potentially be used to ban a vast range
of visual  communication  referring  to  women,  because  what  is  morally injurious  is  not  defined  by any
universal standard, and will differ from person to person. Once again, the notion of morality is at the heart of
the law. Authors Madhu Kishwar and Ruth Vanita argue that the impetus here is a Hindu state dominated by
the values and morals of men who fundamentally, support ‘the notion that anything sexual is obscene and
that respect for women is equivalent to treating them as sexless’.9  A law that in name serves the interests of
women, in practice seeks to curb the sexual and bodily freedoms of women in the name of morality, and by
extension, culture.
Despite the IRWA’s vaguely worded definition of obscenity, however, legal activist and author Flavia Agnes
points out  that there have been no discrepancies in its implementation.  This has,  though, worked to the
detriment of women. She writes, ‘Conversely, the equation of indecency with nudity and sex allowed all
other portrayals of women to pass off as “decent”. When women clad in saris were depicted in servile,
stereotypical  roles,  these images were not  attacked as indecent.’10 Therefore,  while women’s  groups are
seeking to include into the notion of indecency those images depicting women in domestic or submissive
roles, these attempts have had little success, thus further illustrating the way in which it is a wider narrative
of morality that governs these laws, rather than a genuine commitment to the empowerment of women and a
gender equal society. 
In addition to the larger context of colonialism and subsequently a Victorian morality inherited by India’s
middle class,  Kishwar and Vanita identify three reasons for why the IRWA was tabled and passed.   As
highlighted above, their essay on the subject talks of the strength of the conservative lobby in its desire to
impose a repressive culture on people - and in particular, women – in the name of Indian tradition. It also
sees the government as a force that welcomes any opportunity to acquire more control over its citizens.
Finally, the authors point to urban women’s groups who, taking their cues from similar campaigns in the
Western world, campaigned for this law as a means to prevent the exploitation of women in visual culture.
However, given the tensions arising from the battle for ‘culture’ in the context of a powerful conservative
bloc seeking to silence dissenting voices, the question of to what extent and where censorship sits with
women’s rights advocates will always remain at the heart of the issue - and as our research has shown, in the
Internet age, perhaps more so than ever. 
The underlying assumption around which laws focusing on obscenity and (in)decency in India are based is
the belief that sexuality is an inherently corrupting force that serves to destroy the moral and social fabric of
a culture, and therefore, something that needs to be suppressed. Historically and globally there has been a lot
of discomfort around the female body, which has often been seen as something dangerous to be contained
and controlled. In the context of Indian politics and its grappling struggle with cultural identity, the chastity
or purity of the female sexless body has come to be seen as synonymous with both morality and cultural
worth.  It  is  through  this  patriarchal  framework  that  the  Indian  legal  system sees  the  female  body  as
something to be protected – by covering it up. This notion of nudity as exploitation has also been endorsed
by some feminists, who argue that a sexualisation of the female body is insulting, humiliating, and a marker
9  Kishwar, Madhu and Vanita, Ruth (2006). Using Women as a Pretext for Repression: The Indecent Representation of 
Women (Prohibition) Bill. In Bose, B. (Ed.), Gender and Censorship. New Delhi: Women Unlimited. p. 110.
10  Agnes, Flavia (2006). Indecent Representation of Women. In Bose, B. (Ed.), Gender and Censorship. New Delhi: Women 
Unlimited. p. 139.
of objectification. Without a consideration of the notion of consent and the right to self-expression, it is
however questionable to what extent these laws that seek to cover up flesh can usefully contribute to the
wider struggle for women’s rights.
1.3. Consent and the Censor 
a woman’s right not to be exploited, degraded and demeaned by the sexual use of her body is counteracted by her
right to consensually expose her body in whatever way she deems fit, as also by her – and everyone else’s – right to
freedom of speech, expression and representation that is guaranteed by democratic constitutions all over the world.
 Brinda Bose11
Perhaps one of the most neglected questions in relation to a wide range of women's issues asks: where laws
are meant to protect women, what emphasis do they place on consent? In situations that may be potentially
exploitative, a focus on consent considers the wishes of an individual as having precedence over externally
imposed  interpretations.  When  considering  issues  arising  within  the  arena  of  obscenity,  indecency and
immorality,  what  space  does  the  law  provide,  or  deny,  to  women’s  own desires  and  rights  to  express
themselves as sexual or independent individuals? The IRWA, for example, fails to acknowledge the idea that
women may choose certain representations of themselves, or enjoy certain forms of visual entertainment that
the state deems ‘indecent’. Without a provision for consent, can a woman who publishes a ‘sexually explicit’,
‘obscene’ or ‘indecent’ photograph of herself be booked under a series of acts originally designed with the
intention  to  ‘protect’ her?  If  so,  what  is  being  protected  under  these  laws  –  women,  or  an  idea  of
womanhood? As the above sections have shown, legal justice tends to side with the latter. 
How do India's Internet laws, then, fare on their inclusion of consent?
In the IT Act, the question of consent is particularly relevant with regard to three sections. Section 66E of the
IT Act concerns 'punishment for violation of privacy' and reads:
Whoever,  intentionally or  knowingly captures,  publishes or  transmits  the image of a private area of any person
without  his  or  her  consent,  under  circumstances  violating  the  privacy  of  that  person,  shall  be  punished  with 
imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with both.
What is most striking about this law is that the requirement of consent is clearly stated: an image exposing
certain parts of a person’s body ‘without his or her consent’' is punishable. In this respect, Section 66E is a
progressive clause that places consent at the heart of criminalising an act. 
However, this is in stark contrast to the two following sections of the IT Act: Section 67, 'publishing or
transmitting obscene material in electronic form', and Section 67A, 'publishing or transmitting of material
containing sexually explicit act, etc in electronic form'.12 Neither 67 nor 67A allow for the provision that
consensual or voluntary publishing of such material is acceptable, thus effectively overriding the provision
for consent in 66E. In fact, punishments under 67A are exactly the same as those under 67B – a clause
pertaining  to  child  pornography,  both  in  its  distribution  and its  cultivation  of  sexual  relationships  with
children through an online medium. The exposure of a woman's body (irrespective of her consent in the
situation) is thus effectively equated to the sexual exploitation of children,13 indicating the extent to which a
11 Bose, Brinda (2006). Introduction. In Bose, B. (Ed.), Gender and Censorship. New Delhi: Women Unlimited. p. xx. 
12 Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act will be explored in further detail in the following sub-section. 
13 On this point, see also Kovacs, Anja (forthcoming). An Assessment of India's Compliance with UN Special Rapporteur 
Frank La Rue's Recommendations regarding the Internet and Freedom of Expression. New Delhi: Internet Democracy Project. Note 
that the viewing of child pornography is illegal, whereas the viewing of adult pornography is not, though its sale and distribution are.
woman’s consent is overridden and overshadowed by the need to fulfil the public moral compass - as the
previous sections have highlighted. Until consent is on the table, women aren’t being dealt a fair legal hand. 
2. Verbal Abuse Online: How the Law Can Help
The laws discussed so far pertaining to the exploitation of women online address predominantly (though not
solely) the visual representation of the female body and sexuality; however, the primary subject of this study
is to consider the ways in which verbal, textual, or language based harassment plays out online, and the legal
provisions to address these violations and violences. Against the background outlined above, how useful are
existing laws? 
2.1 The IT Act: Understanding Section 66A
Section 66A of the IT Act was included after the Act’s amendment in 2008, and deals with the sending of
offensive messages through communication services. The law reads: 
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,-
a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
b) any  information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger,
obstruction,  insult,  injury,  criminal  intimidation,  enmity,  hatred  or  ill  will,  persistently  by  making use  of  such
computer resource or a communication device; or
c) any electronic mail  or electronic mail  message for  the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to
deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.
Before beginning a detailed discussion of this section, it is worth noting the emphasis placed by the Act on
women’s bodies or sexualities. Within the IT Act, the representation of women and sex is covered under a
greater number of sections, and with heavier punishments than those under Section 66A. 
However, under the IT Act, Section 66A is the most specific legal recourse for the use and misuse of words.
As  highlighted above,  Union Minister for Communication, Information and Technology Sibal  has argued
that Section 66A was designed specifically, among other things, as a response to harassing speech and verbal
abuse as faced disproportionately by women. However, despite the fact that the impetus behind the law may
have been well intended, its vague framing, for many, leaves much to be desired.  Recently in the news for its
draconian enforcement, tendencies toward censorship, and misuse, the problems with 66A are rooted in the
language of the law itself. 
Under 66A, any message or information sent for the purpose of causing ‘annoyance, inconvenience, danger,
obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will’ is punishable. Given the fact that
none of these words are defined within the law, and that they have no singular denotative definitions, the
scope for interpretation is  huge.  Emotive terms such as ‘annoyance’ or ‘inconvenience’ are as open to
subjective interpretation as the ‘moral injury’ posed by a violation of the obscenity or indecency laws, thus
potentially creating a situation where the powerful, rather than the vulnerable, are protected. As a result, the
opposition to 66A has been far greater than its defence, and many people of all genders consider it to be a
violation of the right to freedom of speech, and a means for the state to enforce a higher degree of censorship
in its own interests. 
Furthermore,  66A is  a cognizable  offence,  which means the criminalisation of  speech under  the  law is
subject to the ways in which the case is interpreted by the police, to whom the complaint is filed. In addition
to this, sub-section C of 66A states that the law can be applied to ‘electronic mail messages’, which in effect
includes private mobile phone text messages that may serve to ‘annoy’ or ‘inconvenience’ someone. 
Arrests  made under 66A illustrate the ways in which the law is used to protect those who already have
power, and by extension to curb the right to speech and expression of those without similar influence. During
the shutdown of Mumbai city after the death of Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackery in November 2012, 21 year
old Mumbai resident Shaheen Dhada posted the following status update on Facebook:
With all respect, every day, thousands of people die, but still the world moves on. Just due to one politician died a
natural death, everyone just goes bonkers. They should know, we are resilient by force, not by choice. When was the
last time, did anyone showed some respect or even a two-minute silence for Shaheed Bhagat Singh, Azad, Sukhdev or
any of the people because of whom we are free-living Indians? Respect is earned, given, and definitely not forced.
Today, Mumbai shuts down due to fear, not due to respect.14 
Renu Srinivasan, her 20 year old friend, ‘liked’ the status, following which the two women were arrested
under both Section 66A of the IT Act and Section 505(2) of the IPC, which pertains to promoting enmity ill
will or hatred between classes.15 ‘Insult’ and ‘injury’ – both causes for criminalising speech under Section
66A – are ambiguous words. Earlier in the year, a man with less than 16 followers on Twitter was arrested
under the same section for alleging that the son of Indian Finance Minister P. Chidambaram was corrupt,
subsequently leading the Twitter user to face up to three years of imprisonment along with a fine. In light of
instances such as these, free speech activists and many social media users believe that Section 66A will
become a tool used in the interests of the powerful – either individuals or the state – in order to enforce
censorship and suppress dissent. 
As a result of the manner in which 66A can be used to restrict the freedom of expression, some of the most
abused women online maintain that despite the high degrees of abuse they face, Section 66A would never be
a law to which they would recourse. The issue of gender-based abuse on the Internet remains one of urgent
and  large  scale  propensities,  and  must  be  addressed  by  providing  women  who  experience  abuse  with
sufficient legal recourse. For women who see 66A as being in direct conflict with values of free speech, this
law is problematic. Brinda Bose writes, ‘The central dilemma of censorship for feminists clearly rests on the
(perhaps potential) conflict between the question of freedom of speech, expression and representation on the
one hand and the possibility/threat/reality of exploitation on the other’.16. Perhaps in light of this, it is useful
to consider laws outside of the IT Act that women may use to address the verbal abuse they face online, and
question to what extent they can supplement or entirely replace Section 66A.  
2.2. Beyond the IT Act: Legal Alternatives
The Indian Penal Code (IPC) contains various sections that address crimes of verbal abuse against and the
harassment of women. Section 509 – ‘Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman’ –
pertains directly to sexual harassment, and reads: 
Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits
any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, of that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such
14 'Mumbai shuts down due to fear, not respect'. The Hindu, 19 November 2012. Last accessed 8 March 2013. 
15 The women were initially arrested under 66A (IT Act) and 295A of the IPC, which pertains to the hurting of religious 
sentiments. On further investigation, the charge under 295A was replaced with 505(2). 
16  Bose, Op. Cit., p.xxi.
woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Though initially designed to address the widespread issue of street sexual harassment (or ‘eve-teasing’ in its
watered-down version), Section 509 can be applied to the harassment of women in online spaces. In 2001, a
young man in the 11th Grade was convicted under Section 509 for making vulgar remarks about female
classmates  on  a  website  called  Amazing.com.  It  was  not  only a  successful  use  of  509  to  curb  online
harassment, but the first time a minor had been booked under the law. 
In addition to this, under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2013, the addition of Section 354A to the IPC
provides a more comprehensive definition of sexual harassment, which includes the following acts: 
(i)     physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii)   a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii)  showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
 (iv)  making sexually coloured remarks.
Section 354D of the new Bill pertains to stalking, explicitly including crimes that involve monitoring
the electronic communication of a woman. The law reads: 
Any man who –
 (i)   follows a woman and contacts,  or attempts  to contact  such woman to foster  personal interaction
repeatedly, despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or
(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication
commits the offence of stalking 
Section 507 of the IPC – criminal intimidation by anonymous communication – is another provision that
may be used by women facing harassment and threats online, particularly given the fact that rape threats are
the most common form of verbal harassment faced by women. Furthermore, given the fluidity of identities
and the proliferation of  ‘trolls’ in  virtual  spaces,  the notion of  ‘anonymous communication’ comes into
significant play, allowing women to recourse to the law without knowing the ‘real’ or ‘true’ identity of their
harassers.
Another relevant section of the IPC that may be used in lieu of Section 66A of the IT Act is Section 499,
which pertains to defamation. The law reads: 
Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes
any  imputation  concerning  any  person  intending  to  harm,  or  knowing  or  having  reason  to  believe  that  such
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that
person.
Women bloggers have often expressed their concern over the ways in which the abuse they receive is an
attack on their families or their names.17 The repeated use of the words ‘whore’ or ‘slut’, and the frequent
suggestions of women being involved in various sexual acts can be perceived as slander to the reputation of a
woman, particularly within her family or community. Section 499 of the IPC may therefore perhaps be used
to address this aspect of online abuse, though it is unclear as to whether any precedents for this exist.  
However, the question remains: can a woman choose to use another law in lieu of 66A? Since the inclusion
of Section 66A into the IT Act (and the introduction of the IT Act itself), Internet-based crimes that could be
17  See for example S. E. Smith, 'On Blogging, Threats, and Silence'. Tiger Beatdown, 11 October 2011. Last accessed 8 
March 2013. Our research found the same concern as well. 
dealt with under relevant sections of the IPC seem to be always coupled by a booking under two acts – the
IPC and the IT Act. Given that 66A is a cognizable offence – where the police decide whether or not a crime
has been perpetrated under it – a woman may argue for another law (or set of laws) to be used when she goes
to register a complaint.  However, given the mistrust of and unfavourable experiences with the police as
found in our study18,  the extent to which women will be willing and able to make these arguments with
success is perhaps questionable. Ultimately, the decision is in the hands of law enforcement, for whom the
grounds on which someone may reject Section 66A may be a subject that seems as alien as unnecessary. 
3. The Way Forward: Do We Require Legal Reform?
As highlighted in the previous section, the legal provisions pertaining to women – both online and offline –
are often predicated on the notion of protection rather than empowerment. From indecency and obscenity
provisions that  emphasise  morality over  consent  to  the various  problems raised by the IT Act (and the
difficulties in implementing its alternatives), are the current laws enough? Or is there a need for a wider,
more structural shift in the way women are constructed by the law?
What one can note in the case of all the laws discussed above – and perhaps practically all the laws within
the Indian legal system – is the way in which they emphasise the individual rather than the collective. In both
the IT Act and the IPC, instances of harassment, intimidation and violations of privacy are seen as isolated
instances existing between the perpetrator and the victim, rather than as part of a systemic discrimination that
privileges certain groups of people above others. The fact that violence against women takes place within a
wider and systemic marginalisation of women throughout society is not legally acknowledged anywhere.
However,  given  the  low  success  rates  in  implementing  women’s  laws,  would  an  acknowledgement  of
structural gender inequalities in a more general law actually help?
3.1 Do We Need a Wider Women’s Law? 
Currently, the only legal provision in India that acknowledges the historical and structural marginalisation of
any disadvantaged group is The Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. The Act’s
statement of objects and reasons for the formation of the Act (in addition to the Protection of Civil Rights Act
and the sections of the Indian Constitution pertaining to caste) reads:
despite various measures to improve the socioeconomic conditions of SCs & STs, they remain vulnerable. They are
denied a number of civil rights; they are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and harassment. They
have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and property. Serious atrocities are committed against
them for various historical, social and economic reasons. (my italics) 
Here we find a legal recognition of systemic marginalisation that general laws cannot sufficiently address. In
light  of  this,  it  is  maybe then through a legal  acknowledgement of the wider,  structural  gender-unequal
system in which crimes against  women take place – and the horrifying effects  this  has -  that  the laws
surrounding women may be strengthened. 
Whether this should be developed through a separate act – as in the case of the SC/ST example – or by
incorporating  a  recognition  of  structural  discrimination  into  existing  laws  that  currently  isolate  and
individualise crimes, are questions that need to be considered in greater depth and after further research and
discussion. It is perhaps useful to note here that the conviction rates under laws protecting women tend to be
low, and they are believed by many to be ‘soft laws’ without real consequences.  To develop a law that
recognises the structural marginalisation of women may either change this attitude or further entrench it.
18 See Chapter 6, 'The Final Solution? Taking Recourse to the Law', in 'Don't Let it Stand!'.
Therefore, it may be more useful to instead incorporate gender into existing laws around  speech to better
address verbal abuse against women. 
3.2 Do We Need a Better Hate Speech Law? 
One could argue that the current provision against hate speech in Indian law is Section 153A of the IPC,
which criminalises the promoting of enmity between different groups on the grounds of religion, race, place
of birth, residence, language etc., and doing prejudicial acts to maintenance of harmony. The law reads: 
Whoever - by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or
attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place or birth, residence, language, caste or community or any
other ground whatsoever,  disharmony or feelings of enmity,  hatred or ill-will  between different religious,  racial,
language or regional groups or castes or communities… shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.
There are three central problems with the law as it is currently structured. The first is that the thresholds for
when speech under the law can be criminalised are unclear. In a report to the UN, Special Rapporteur Frank
La Rue outlines the thresholds for hate speech, wherein the speech must be of a public nature, and at the very
minimum must present a real and imminent danger, and contain the intention to harm where the harm must
be obvious. It is only when speech crosses these thresholds that it should be criminalised. 19 This is in stark
contrast to Section 153A, which apart from hatred, includes ‘disharmony or  feelings  of enmity or ill-will’
(my italics), and like Section 66A, creates a legal situation where someone ‘feeling’ insulted can result in
criminalisation – or censorship – of speech. Therefore, one way to strengthen the laws around speech in India
would be to explicitly adopt internationally recognised thresholds for hate speech – most notably outlined by
Frank La Rue – in order to prevent a misuse of the law to promote censorship and restrict free speech. 
Secondly, while 153A addresses the incitement of hatred based on identity, it fails to account for the unequal
power relations between different groups, races and religions. Without this inclusion of wider discrimination,
the law places all groups – religious, racial, etc – on equal footing, where the slander of an economically
powerful majority can be equated with that of a marginalised community or individual. In order for hate
speech laws to effectively curb hate speech rather than foster a culture of censorship, they must clearly also
be  anti-discrimination  laws,  where  discrimination  is  understood  as  the  historical  and  systemic
marginalisation of a group of people on the basis of their identity. 
Lastly, 153A only takes into account certain aspects of a person’s identity – excluding, most notably in the
context  of  this  study,  gender.   The  phrase ‘on  any other  ground whatsoever’ could perhaps be used to
persecute people for hate speech pertaining to an individual’s identity on a variety of grounds other than
those explicitly stipulated; however, there exists no legal precedent for this, and it is unlikely that a case
pertaining to gender-based hate speech can be successfully tried under this law. Many suggest, however, that
hate speech laws across the world should include more aspects of  an individual’s  identity,  extending to
gender,  sexual  orientation,  and  disability.  A striking  example  of  this  is  South  Africa’s  hate  speech and
harassment law – The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000) – which
lists the grounds for identity-based discrimination as race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and
birth. 
Therefore,  perhaps  another  legal  solution  to  strengthen  the  laws  around  women  is  to  develop  a  more
inclusive hate speech law that takes into account the systematic discrimination of people on the basis of
19  La Rue, Frank (2012). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression (A/67/357). New York, United Nations General Assembly, 7 September 2012. 
different  aspects  of  their  identities,  with high and rigorously applied thresholds  for  what  ‘incitement  to
hatred’ means. 
Conclusion
In a wider legal context that seeks to ‘protect’ women – most often without taking into account their consent
or wishes to express themselves in certain ways – how can we forge a legal response that truly advances
women’s rights? It is first important to take into account how the representation of women through visual
culture has been largely seen as immoral or indecent, and consider whether this framing is more restrictive
than it is progressive. Furthermore, with the development of a law like Section 66A of the IT Act – which has
been used across the board to enforce censorship to an unprecedented degree – in the name of women’s
rights, it is important to find legal alternatives that allow women to seek recourse without impinging on the
freedom of expression. 
In light of this, the possible suggestions this paper makes are the use of alternative legal provisions, the
development of a broader women’s law that accounts for systemic discrimination, and the development of
rigorous hate speech laws that take into account gender, amongst other aspects of an individual’s identity.
Rather than providing solutions to an issue that extends to nearly all laws within India that seek to address
women’s rights,  this paper hopes to have provided a starting point for further conversations, debate and
discussion around possible legal measures to address the verbal abuse faced by women online. 
